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Table A.1 
Variable definitions 
 
Variable name Description 
Table 1  
War veteran =1 if the household head is a war veteran 
Disabled =1 if the household head is disabled 
Female =1 if the household head is female for the regressions of tax 
exemption and health insurance. 
=1 if the child is female for the regression of scholarship. 
Khmer =1 if the household head is Khmer. 
Chinese =1 if the household head is Chinese. 
Table 4  
Khmer =1 if the subject is Khmer. 
Chinese =1 if the subject is Chinese. 
V-Outgroup =1 if the subject is Vietnamese and the opponent is a member of 
an outgroup. 
K-Outgroup =1 if the subject is Khmer and the opponent is a member of an 
outgroup. 
C-Outgroup =1 if the subject is Chinese and the opponent is a member of an 
outgroup. 
V-OutgroupK =1 if the subject is Vietnamese and the opponent is Khmer. 
C-OutgroupK =1 if the subject is Chinese and the opponent is Khmer. 
Table 5  
Age Age of the subject 
Gender Gender of the subject, 1=male 
Education Number of years the subject attended school 
Traditional =1 if subject’s main occupation is farming, fishery, or raising 
livestock.  
Trade =1 if subject’s main occupation is trading (street vendors). 
Business =1 if the subject is engaged in household business. 
Public =1 if the subject works for a public organization.  
Private =1 if the subject works for a private organization. 
Casual =1 if the subject is a daily laborer. 
ReIncome Subject’s relative wealth within the community, measured by 
subject’s household income divided by the mean income of the 
village. 
MnIncome Mean household income of the village (million dong) among 25 
households surveyed in 2002 
Outgroup =1 if the subject is playing the game against a member of an 
outgroup. 
OutgroupK =1 if the subject is not Khmer and the opponent is Khmer. 
Envy The amount the subject sends in envy game 
Expectation =1 if the subject expects Player 2 to reciprocate. 
Table 6  
V x P2 is outgroup =1 if the subject is Vietnamese and Player 2 is a member of an 
outgroup. 
  
V x P3 is outgroup 
=1 if the subject is Vietnamese and Player 3 is a member of an 
outgroup. 
V x P1 is outgroup =1 if the subject is Vietnamese and Player 1 is a member of an 
outgroup. 
Opposite role behavior The mean minimum accepted offer Player 1 (sender) chose when 
they played the role of Player 3 (punisher), and the mean offer 
Player 3 made when they played the role of Player 1. 
Table 7  
Competence  Estimated factor that represents images such as “competent”, 
“confident”, “efficient” and “skillful”. 
Warmth Estimated factor that represents images such as “tolerant”, 
“warm”, “good natured” and “sincere”. 
Status Estimated factor that represents images such as “having 
prestigious jobs”, “intelligent” and “educated”. 
Competition Estimated factor that represents images such as “getting special 
breaks”, “power” and “taking away resources from my group”. 
Acquaintance  Ratio of the subjects the subject knows by name in the opponent’s 
ethnic group. 
Parent =1 if the ethnicity of the opponent is the same as the player’s 
parent’s ethnicity. 
Spouse =1 if the ethnicity of the opponent is the same as the player’s 
spouse’s ethnicity.  
Neighbor The number of subject’s neighbors who belong to the opponent’s 
ethnic group. 
Pop-Share Population share of the subject’s ethnic group (%) 
Pol-Power Political power of the subject’s ethnic group measured by 
[(Number of village officials of the subject’s ethnicity)/ (Number 
of households of the subject’s ethnicity)] / [(Total number of 
village officials)/ (Total number of households)] 
Re-Wealth The mean income of the opponent’s ethnic group divided by the 
mean income of the player’s own ethnic group. 
 
 
  
 
Table A.2 
Stereotype questions 
 
Construct Items 
Competence How ____ are members of this group? 
1: competent, 2: confident, 3: capable, 4: efficient, 5: intelligent, 6:skillful
Warmth How ____ are members of this group? 
7: tolerant, 8: warm, 9: good natured, 10: sincere 
Status 11: How prestigious are the jobs typically achieved by members of this 
group? 
12: How economically successful have members of this group been? 
13: How well educated are members of this group? 
Competition  14: If members of this group get special breaks (such as preference in 
hiring decisions), this is likely to make things more difficult for people 
like me.  
15: The more power members of this group have, the less power people 
like me are likely to have. 
16: Resources that go to members of this group are likely to take away 
from the resources of people like me. 
 
 
  
Table A.3 
Factor scores 
 Orthogonally rotated factors 
 1 (competence) 2 (warmth) 3 (status) 4 (competition) 
1: Competent 0.27 0.03 -0.08 0.03
2: Confident 0.22 0.09 -0.11 0.07
3: Capable 0.22 -0.09 0.08 -0.00
4: Efficient 0.23 0.00 0.00 -0.02
5: Intelligent 0.13 -0.09 0.20 -0.03
6: Skillful 0.42 -0.15 -0.23 0.01
7: Tolerant 0.11 0.26 -0.21 0.07
8: Warm -0.04 0.30 0.01 0.06
9: Good natured -0.10 0.39 -0.02 0.02
10: Sincere -0.18 0.40 0.04 -0.04
11: Prestigious jobs -0.23 0.01 0.48 0.05
12: Successful 0.12 -0.05 0.19 -0.05
13: Educated -0.11 -0.04 0.44 -0.07
14: Special breaks 0.09 0.04 -0.16 0.42
15: Power -0.02 0.00 0.08 0.40
16: Resources -0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.41
 
 
 
 
  
Table A4 
Ordered logit regression results for third party punishment game 
 
 Player 1 (Sender) Player 3 (Punisher) 
  VK Villages VC Villages VK Villages VC Villages 
Age -0.015 0.011 0.011 -0.018 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) 
Gender 0.024 0.803* 0.325 -0.652 
 (0.377) (0.470) (0.333) (0.431) 
Education 0.040 -0.007 -0.039 -0.028 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.076) 
Traditional 0.164 -0.242 -0.067 0.958 
 (0.383) (0.501) (0.327) (0.536) 
Trade 2.350*** 1.444** -0.169 -0.376 
 (0.770) (0.672) (1.030) (0.771) 
Business -0.394 0.560 -1.064 0.798 
 (1.092) (0.547) (1.560) (0.706) 
Public -0.347 0.165 1.472*** 0.573 
 (0.665) (0.570) (0.540) (0.779) 
Private 0.093 -0.167 -0.026 0.851 
 (1.092) (0.632) (0.691) (0.668) 
Casual 0.443 0.215 0.323 1.008 
 (0.542) (0.804) (0.618) (0.811) 
ReIncome 0.045 0.118 0.000 -0.244 
 (0.342) (0.161) (0.235) (0.160) 
V x P2 is outgroup -0.132 -0.562** -0.061 -0.438** 
 (0.228) (0.225) (0.194) (0.224) 
V x P3 is outgroup -0.028 -0.067     
 (0.135) (0.127)    
V x P1 is outgroup  0.172 0.047 
  (0.297) (0.167) 
Khmer  -0.874** 0.673
 (0.403)  (0.414)  
K x P2 is outgroup -0.676***  -0.353**  
 (0.209)  (0.158)  
K x P3 is outgroup 0.012    
                (0.143)    
K x P1 is outgroup   0.244*  
   (0.146)  
Chinese (C)  -0.450  -0.037 
  (0.465)  (0.414) 
C x P2 is outgroup  -0.386**  0.341 
  (0.173)  (0.235) 
C x P3 is outgroup   -0.099   
  (0.126)   
C x P1 is outgroup    -0.365 
  
    (0.230) 
Opposite role 
behavior 0.806*** 0.923*** 0.614*** 0.640*** 
 (0.143) (0.180) (0.120) (0.196) 
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.160 0.112 0.121 
N 384 308 384 308  
Note: Results are robust regressions with standard errors corrected for correlations within 
individuals. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The crucial coefficients for 
relative favoritism of Vietnames toward Khmer are the “VxP2 is outgroup” coefficients 
highlighted in bold italic.  
 Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 
10% level. 
 
Table A5 
Regression results for trust game 
 
Trust Game  
(Player 1) 
(Fixed effect logit) 
Trust Game  
(Player 2) 
(Fixed effect logit)
Khmer  0.297 -1.131*** 
  (0.389) (0.398) 
Chinese  -0.337 -0.649* 
  (0.329) (0.340) 
Age  -0.016 -0.007 
  (0.011) (0.009) 
Gender  0.105 0.182 
  (0.256) (0.241) 
Education  -0.050 0.011 
  (0.044) (0.040) 
Traditional  0.172 0.433 
  (0.369) (0.361) 
Trade  0.425 -0.027 
  (0.450) (0.372) 
Business  0.019 0.103 
  (0.418) (0.427) 
Public  0.731 -0.546 
  (0.599) (0.581) 
Private  0.869 0.340 
  (0.657) (0.524) 
Casual  0.619* 0.571 
  (0.356) (0.356) 
ReIncome  0.390** 0.098 
  (0.163) (0.143) 
MnIncome  9.245 55.972 
  (49.576) (44.213) 
Outgroup  -0.351* -0.513*** 
  (0.203) (0.158) 
  
OutgroupK  -0.131 0.306 
  (0.230) (0.245) 
Envy  0.003 0.014** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Expectation  1.453***  
  (0.240)  
Constant  -1.365 -0.536 
  (1.433) (1.303) 
Pseudo R2  0.143 0.089 
Observation   552  552  
Note: We conducted ordered logit and logit regressions with village fixed effects. We 
adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. Robust standard errors. 
  
 
  
 
 
Table A.6 
Regression results including individual-specific stereotyping 
 
Envy Game 
(Fixed effect 
ordered-logit) 
Dictator Game 
(Fixed effect 
ordered-logit) 
Trust Game  
(Player 1) 
(Fixed effect logit)
Trust Game  
(Player 2) 
(Fixed effect logit) 
Khmer 0.558* -0.213 0.274 -1.067*** 
 (0.304) (0.316) (0.392) (0.395) 
Chinese 0.150 -0.122 -0.245 -0.666* 
 (0.313) (0.335) (0.340) (0.351) 
Age -0.001 -0.010 -0.016 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
Gender 0.017 0.322 0.134 0.194 
 (0.235) (0.224) (0.258) (0.241) 
Education 0.047 -0.030 -0.051 0.013 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.045) (0.039) 
Traditional -0.784** -0.579** 0.124 0.419 
 (0.319) (0.285) (0.378) (0.364) 
Trade -0.327 -0.272 0.353 -0.069 
 (0.389) (0.381) (0.445) (0.369) 
Business -0.879** -0.558 0.006 0.053 
 (0.404) (0.446) (0.422) (0.436) 
Public -0.418 -0.552 0.721 -0.618 
 (0.477) (0.451) (0.589) (0.570) 
Private -0.627 -0.551 0.893 0.241 
 (0.733) (0.459) (0.675) (0.518) 
Casual 0.202 -0.032 0.596 0.541* 
 (0.325) (0.284) (0.365) (0.353) 
ReIncome 0.002 0.156 0.368** 0.111 
 (0.106) (0.127) (0.166) (0.143) 
MnIncome -80.904 -326.342** 11.156 65.250 
 (56.364) (159.616) (50.900) (43.947) 
Outgroup -0.739*** -0.487*** -0.232 -0.456*** 
 (0.134) (0.112) (0.205) (0.176) 
OutgroupK 0.613** 0.734*** -0.612 0.056 
 (0.252) (0.248) (0.468) (0.321) 
Envy   0.003 0.012** 
   (0.007) (0.006) 
Expectation   1.452***  
   (0.238)  
Competence 0.136 0.208* -0.146 -0.103 
  
 (0.111) (0.115) (0.182) (0.133) 
Warmth 0.269** 0.085 -0.069 0.309** 
 (0.113) (0.109) (0.158) (0.134) 
Status 0.036 0.214* -0.362** -0.080 
 (0.115) (0.127) (0.172) (0.150) 
Competition -0.322*** -0.091 -0.102 -0.158 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.146) (0.117) 
Constant     -1.332 -0.726 
     (1.460) (1.297) 
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.038 0.152 0.097 
Observation 552  646  552  552  
Note: We conducted ordered logit and logit regressions with village fixed effects. We 
adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** 
Significant at the 10% level. 
 
  
Figure A.1 
Experimental Procedure 
 
Vietnamese experimenter Pham Thanh Xuan reads a general instruction in Vietnamese. 
 
 
Khmer experimenter Danh Na Ret reads a general instruction in Khmer. 
 
  
After the general instruction, subjects go out of the room. They receive instruction and 
record sheets for each game. Subjects are helped by research assistants when making 
decisions.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure A.2 
Percentage of choices between groups in the coalition game 
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Game Instructions 
 
Subjects first received the Introductory Comments as a group. Introductory Comments 
were written in Vietnamese and Khmer.  
After the general instruction, subjects went out of the room, one by one, and a student 
assistant read the instruction for each game for each subject, and assisted the subjects to 
play each game. The order of roles within games was randomized across subjects. Here, 
we present a sample instruction for the case a subject played the role of Player 1 first in 
each game. 
 
Introductory Comments 
 
Thank you all for taking the time to come today. Today’s session will take as much as 3 
hours, so if you think you will not be able to stay that long let us know now. Before we 
begin I want to make some general comments about what we are doing and explain the 
rules we must follow. We will be playing several games with money. Whatever money 
you win in the games will be yours to keep and take home.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will answer your questions in 
private. Please do not ask questions to your friends or talk about the game with them. 
Please remain quite during the session. This is very important.  
 
You will be playing games with people in White Group, Yellow Group, and Red Group. 
You will play each game with different person in different group. 
 
We will ask you to leave this room one by one, and play the games in private. Please look 
around the room and remember who belongs to which Group. Once you leave this room, 
you won’t have a chance to look at people in this room. 
 
White Group is wearing white tags. Yellow Group is wearing Yellow tags. Red Group is 
wearing red tags.  
 
Groups are based on ethnicity. 
 
 
  
 
Game 1 (Battle of the Sexes, Player 1) 
 
This game will be played by two people; Player 1 and Player 2. You are Player 1 in this 
game.  Player 2 is someone in this session. You will never know who is Player 2, and 
Player 2 will never find out that you are Player 1. 
 
Each player is going to choose between Left and Right.  
 
If you choose Left and Player 2 also chooses Left, you receive 25,000 dong and Player 2 
receives 15,000 dong. 
 
If you choose Left and Player 2 chooses Right, nobody receives money. 
 
If you choose Right and Player 2 chooses Left, nobody receives money. 
 
If you choose Right and Player 2 also chooses Right, you receive 15,000 dong and Player 
2 receives 25,000 dong. 
 
 
 Player 2 chooses Left Player 2 chooses Right 
You choose 
Left 
 
You earn 25,000 dong 
 
Player 2 earns 15,000 dong 
 
Nobody receives money 
You choose 
Right Nobody receives money 
 
You earn 15,000 dong 
 
Player 2 earns 25,000 dong 
 
  
 
Quiz: If you choose Right and Player 2 chooses Right,  
How much do you earn?  
How much does Player 2 earn?  
Pass / Fail 
 
 
Quiz: If you choose Right and Player 2 chooses Left,  
How much do you earn?  
How much does Player 2 earn?  
Pass / Fail 
 
Quiz: If you choose Left and Player 2 chooses Right,  
How much do you earn?  
How much does Player 2 earn?  
Pass / Fail 
 
 
Quiz: If you choose Left and Player 2 chooses Left,  
How much do you earn?  
How much does Player 2 earn?  
Pass / Fail 
 
 
 
At this moment, we don’t know who is going to be Player 2. We will randomly match 
you with someone in the session after everyone completes the games. So, please let us 
know your decisions, depending on the group of Player 2 
 
We will never reveal your decisions to anyone.  
 
 
 
Game 2 (Coalition Game, Player 1) 
 
This game will be played by three people; Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3. You are Player 
1 in this game.  Player 1 and Player 2 are someone in this session. You will never know 
who are Player 1 and Player 2, and Player 1 and Player 2 will never find out that you are 
Player 1. 
 
You are going to vote for one of the three plans. 
 
Plan 12: You (Player 1) and Player 2 will receive 15,000 dong each. 
Plan 13: You (Player 1) and Player 3 will receive 15,000 dong each. 
Plan 23: Player 2 and Player 3 will receive 15,000 dong each. 
 
  
  Plan 12  Plan 13  Plan 23 
       
You (Player 1) 15,000 dong 15,000 dong 0 dong
 
Player 2 15,000 dong 0 dong 15,000 dong
 
Player 3  0 dong 15,000 dong 15,000 dong
 
 
 
Any plan that receives at least 2 votes will be executed. If no plan receives at least 2 
votes, nobody earns money. 
 
 
Quiz: If you and Player 2 vote for Plan 12, and Player 3 votes for Plan 13, which plan 
will be executed? 
How much do you earn? 
How much does Player 2 earn? 
How much does Player 3 earn?     Pass / Fail 
 
 
 
Quiz: If you vote for Plan 13, and Player 2 and Player 3 vote for Plan 23, which plan will 
be executed? 
How much do you earn? 
How much does Player 2 earn? 
How much does Player 3 earn?     Pass / Fail 
 
 
 
Quiz: If you vote for Plan 12, Player 2 votes for Plan 23, and Player 3 votes for Plan 13, 
which plan will be executed? 
How much do you earn? 
How much does Player 2 earn? 
How much does Player 3 earn?     Pass / Fail 
 
At this moment, we don’t know who will be Player 2 and Player 3. We will randomly 
match you with two other people in the session after everyone completes the games. So, 
please let us know your decisions, depending on the groups of Player 2 and Player 3. 
 
We will never reveal your decisions to anyone.  
 
 
 
  
Game 3 (Envy Game, Player 1) 
 
This game will be played by two people; Player 1 and Player 2. You are Player 1 in this 
game.  Player 2 is someone in this session. You will never know who is Player 2, and 
Player 2 will never find out that you are Player 1. 
 
As Player 1, you receive 12,000 dong. You must decide how much Player 2 should 
receive. Following your decision, we will give Player 2 either 0 dong, 5,000 dong, 10,000 
dong, 12,000 dong, 15,000 dong, 30,000 dong or 60,000 dong. 
 
At this moment, we don’t know who will be Player 2. We will randomly match you with 
someone after everyone completes the games. So, please let us know your decisions, 
depending on the group of Player 2. Regardless your decision for Player 2, you will 
receive 12,000 dong. 
 
We will never reveal your decisions to anyone.  
 
 
 
Game 4 (Envy Game, Player 2) 
 
This Game is the same as Game 3. You are now Player 2 in this game. 
Player 1 will receive 12,000 dong, and decide how much you should receive. Following 
Player 1’s decision, you will receive either 0 dong, 5,000 dong, 10,000 dong, 12,000 
dong, 15,000 dong, 30,000 dong or 60,000 dong.  
 
At this moment, we don’t know who will be Player 2. We will randomly match you with 
someone after everyone completes the games. And you will never be matched with the 
same player as in Game 3. 
 
 
 
Game 5 (Trust Game, Player 1) 
 
This game will be played by two people; Player 1 and Player 2. You are Player 1 in this 
game.  Player 2 is someone in this session. You will never know who is Player 2, and 
Player 2 will never find out that you are Player 1. 
 
  
You may choose Plan A or Plan B. If you choose Plan A, you will receive 20,000 dong 
and Player 2 will receive 20,000 dong. 
 
If you choose Plan B, then Player 2’s choice will determine how much you and Player 2 
will earn.  
 
If Player 2 chooses Plan B1, you will receive 10,000 dong and Player 2 will 
receive 50,000 dong.  
 
If Player 2 chooses Plan B2, you will receive 30,000 dong and Player 2 will 
receive 30,000 dong.  
 
You choose Plan A You choose Plan B 
 Player 2 chooses  
Plan B1 
Player 2 chooses 
Plan B2 
You: 20,000 dong You: 10,000 dong You: 30,000 dong 
Player 2: 20,000 dong Player 2: 50,000 dong Player 2: 30,000 dong 
 
 
 
At this moment, we don’t know who will be Player 2. We will randomly match you with 
someone after everyone completes the games. So, please let us know your decisions, 
depending on the group of Player 2.  
   
We will never reveal your decisions to anyone.  
 
  
 
 Game 6 (Trust Game, Player 2) 
 
This Game is the same as Game 5. You are now Player 2 in this game.  
 
At this moment, we don’t know who will be Player 1. We will randomly match you with 
someone after everyone completes the games. And you will never be matched with the 
same player as in Game 5. 
 
 
Player 1 chooses Plan A Player 1 chooses Plan B 
 You choose Plan B1 You choose Plan B2 
Player 1: 20,000 dong Player 1: 10,000 dong Player  1: 30,000 dong 
You: 20,000 dong You: 50,000 dong You : 30,000 dong 
 
 
Please decide whether you would choose B1 or B2, if Player 1 has chosen Plan B. 
  
 
We will never reveal your decisions to anyone.  
 
 
Game 7 (Dictator Game, Player 1) 
 
This game will be played by two people; Player 1 and Player 2. You are Player 1 in this 
game.  Player 2 is someone in this session. You will never know who is Player 2, and 
Player 2 will never find out that you are Player 1. 
 
As Player 1, you receive 10,000 dong. You must decide how to divide 10,000 dong 
between yourself and Player 2. You can give some, all or no money to Player 2, and keep 
the rest of money for yourself. 
 
At this moment, we don’t know who will be Player 2. We will randomly match you with 
someone after everyone completes the games. So, please let us know your decisions, 
depending on the group of Player 2.  
 
We will never reveal your decisions to anyone.  
 
 
 
Game 8 (Dictator Game, Player 2) 
 
This Game is the same as Game 7. You are now Player 2 in this game. 
Player 1 will receive 10,000 dong, and decide how to allocate the money between you 
and Player 1. 
 
At this moment, we don’t know who will be Player 2. We will randomly match you with 
someone after everyone completes the games. And you will never be matched with the 
same player as in Game 7. 
 
Game 9 (Third Party Punishment Game, Player 1) 
 
There are three players in this game - Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3. You are Player 1 
in this game.  Player 2 and Player 3 are someone in this session. You will never know 
who are Player 2 and Player 3, and they will never find out that you are Player 1. 
 
Like in Game 7, you receive 10,000 dong as Player 1. You must decide how to divide 
10,000 dong between yourself and Player 2. You can give some, all or no money to 
Player 2, and keep the rest of money for yourself. 
 
Player 3 will be given 5000 dong. Player 3 will decide whether he/she wants to give up 
1000 dong to subtract 3000 dong from the money you kept for yourself. If Player 3 
decides not to give up 1000 dong, you will receive all the money you kept for yourself.  
 
  
For example, suppose you decide to allocate 2000 dong to Player 2. If Player 3 decides to 
give up 1000 dong and reduce your money by 3000 dong, you receive 5000 dong (8000 
dong minus 3000 dong). Player 2 receives 2000 dong, and Player 3 receives 4000 dong 
(5000 dong minus 1000 dong).  
 
Player 3’s decision depends on how much money you allocate to Player 2. 
 
At this moment, we don’t know who will be Player 2 and Player 3. We will randomly 
match you with someone after everyone completes the games. So, please let us know 
your decisions, depending on the groups of Player 2 and player 3. Please remember that 
your actual payment may reduce by 3000 dong if Player 3 decides to pay 1000 dong to 
subtract 3000 dong from your payment. 
 
We will never reveal your decisions to anyone.  
 
 
 
Game 10 (Third Party Punishment Game, Player 3) 
 
This is the same as Game 9. There are three players in this game - Player 1, Player 2, and 
Player 3. You are Player 3 in this game.  Player 1 and Player 2 are someone in this 
session. You will never know who are Player 1 and Player 2, and they will never find out 
that you are Player 3. 
 
Player 1 will receive 10,000 dong. He/she will decide how to divide 10,000 dong 
between himself/herself and Player 2.  
 
We will give you 5000 dong. You must decide whether you want to pay 1000 dong to 
subtract 3000 dong from the money Player 1 kept for himself/herself. If you decide not to 
pay 1000 dong to reduce Player 1’s money, Player 1 will receive all the money he/she 
kept for himself/herself. 
 
At this moment, we don’t know who will be Player 1 and Player 2. We will randomly 
match you with someone after everyone completes the games. So, please let us know 
your decision for the following cases, depending on the groups of Player 1 and player 2.  
 
If Player 1 decides to give Player 2 nothing and keep 10000 dong for himself/herself, do 
you want to pay 1000 dong and subtract 3000 dong from Player 1’s payment? 
 
If Player 1 decides to give Player 2 1000 dong and keep 9000 dong for himself/herself, 
do you want to pay 1000 dong to subtract 3000 dong from Player 1’s payment? 
 
  
If Player 1 decides to give Player 2 2000 dong and keep 8000 dong for himself/herself, 
do you want to pay 1000 dong to subtract 3000 dong from Player 1’s payment? 
If Player 1 decides to give Player 2 3000 dong and keep 7000 dong for himself/herself, 
do you want to pay 1000 dong to subtract 3000 dong from Player 1’s payment? 
 
If Player 1 decides to give Player 2 4000 dong and keep 6000 dong for himself/herself, 
do you want to pay 1000 dong to subtract 3000 dong from Player 1’s payment? 
 
If Player 1 decides to give Player 2 5000 dong and keep 5000 dong for himself/herself, 
do you want to pay 1000 dong to subtract 3000 dong from Player 1’s payment? 
 
We will never reveal your decisions to anyone.  
  
 
  
 
Section A.1: Policy institutions reflecting paternalistic treatment of the Khmer 
 
 Field data suggests that many aspects of social welfare systems in southern 
Vietnam parallel the experimental behavior, showing relative favoritism toward 
effectively helping the Khmer. The 2002 World Bank living standard household survey 
(Phung and Phong 2006) data which we used to measure sociodemographic variables also 
includes information on whether respondents receive free health insurance, land tax 
exemptions, and educational scholarships for their children between the ages of seven 
and fifteen. The Khmer do receive more of these subsidies overall. However, since these 
subsidies are disproportionally shared by low-income citizens (and correlated with other 
variables), it is possible that the disproportional Khmer take-up of subsidies is due 
entirely to their lower income as a group. The general survey data permit us test this 
hypothesis. Table A.1 contains the logistic regression results for take-up of the three 
subsidies (the dependent variable), controlling for village fixed effect, income, gender, 
and whether household heads are war veterans or are disabled. 
 Income does have a strong negative effect (poorer households generally take up 
more subsidies). But Khmer households are also significantly more likely to receive these 
welfare benefits, even after controlling for income and other variables.  
This field evidence shows that some governmental policies favor the outgroup 
Khmer.   Our experimental games were not specifically designed to resemble policy 
choices of health, tax and education subsidies; so it is by no means clear that sharing and 
punishing unfair sharing in simple experiments will show parallel results. However, the 
lab and field data turn out to both be consistent with an interpretation of the Vietnamese 
as generally choosing both experimental behaviors and social policies which erase typical 
outgroup discrimination (making an exception for the Khmer), as shown in the 
experiments, or actively subsidizing the Khmer, as shown in the social policies.  
In fact, subsidies of various sorts are a common way to help low-status groups. 
Specialized trade allowances include legalized casino gambling allocated to Native 
American tribes in the United States.  Alaskan Inuits have a special allowance to carve 
walrus ivory and “transform” other marine mammal parts and distribute them within the 
  
US.  Aboriginal First Nations Canadians are allowed to make cigarettes that are tax-free 
(reducing their price by 80%).   
 
Table A7 
Fixed-effect logistic regression results for determinants of getting subsidies  
in the Mekong Delta in 2002 
 Free health insurance Tax exemption 
Scholarships 
(for children ages 7-15)
Income  -111.45*** -101.95*** -31.13*** 
 (13.39) (9.52) (2.28) 
War veteran 1.54*** 0.71*** 0.69*** 
 (0.23) (0.20) (0.12) 
Disabled 1.98*** 1.30*** 0.12 
 (0.35) (0.31) (0.34) 
Female -0.06 -0.15 -0.04 
 (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) 
Khmer  0.67* 0.89*** 1.54*** 
 (0.35) (0.24) (0.18) 
Chinese -21.42 0.86 0.17 
 (35782.57) (0.57) (0.33) 
Constant -2.90*** -1.92*** 0.26*** 
 (0.253) (0.17) (0.08) 
Log likelihood -705.24 -1176.84 -4122.06 
N 6298 6298 6886 
 
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 
10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. We controlled for village fixed 
effects. 
 
